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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











RAYMOND LAWLER, Superintendent, SCI Huntingdon; 
CHARLES MITCHELL, Hearing Examiner, SCI Huntingdon;  
ROBERT B.  MACINTYRE, Chief Hearing Examiner, SCI Camp Hill;  
C/O DIFFIN; C/O EBERLING 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 4-10-cv-01266) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
and for Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 15, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN AND GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 







 Fred Carter, a prisoner committed to the custody of the Pennsylvania Department 
of Corrections (“DOC”) at SCI-Huntingdon, appeals pro se from the order of the United 
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States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss his amended complaint.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm 
the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 Carter filed a complaint in the District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and later 
filed an amended complaint.  The allegations in the amended complaint stemmed from a 
misconduct that Carter received following a violent altercation with another inmate.  
Carter alleged that on June 14, 2009, Inmate Nguyen entered his cell and initiated a fight 
with him.  Defendant Eberling, a Correctional Officer (“C/O”) at SCI-Huntingdon, 
responded to the incident and, upon entering Carter’s cell, noticed blood throughout the 
cell.  At that time, Carter was questioned about the blood but denied being part of a fight 
with Nguyen.  However, Carter conceded in his amended complaint that Nguyen suffered 
severe injuries as a result of their altercation.  Defendant Eberling cited Carter for 
misconduct and charged him with assault and lying to an employee.   
 Several days later, Defendant Mitchell presided over Carter’s prison disciplinary 
hearing.  Based upon video evidence and C/O Eberling’s Report, Defendant Mitchell 
found Carter guilty of both charges.  Carter appealed that decision to the Program Review 
Committee (“PRC”), comprised of Defendants Ciavarella, Corbin, and Fisher.  The PRC 
denied the appeal.  Carter appealed twice more, first to Defendant Lawler, the 
superintendent, and subsequently to Defendant MacIntyre, the Chief Hearing Examiner.  
All of Carter’s appeals were denied.  As a result of the finding of guilt, the DOC ordered 
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Carter to reimburse the prison for Nguyen’s medical expenses, which were found to total 
$16,624.28.  This order entitled Carter to an assessment hearing, at which Carter was 
permitted to challenge the amount assessed.  Carter was unsuccessful in his challenge and 
the Secretary of the DOC issued a final adjudication requiring Carter to reimburse the 
DOC $16,624.28. 
 Carter’s amended complaint alleged that Defendants violated his constitutional 
rights, in various ways, in connection with the issuance of the misconduct.  As relief, 
Carter asked the District Court to declare the entire misconduct proceedings 
unconstitutional, order the misconduct expunged from his records, and award him 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
 The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The United States Magistrate Judge 
assigned to the case issued a report recommending that the District Court dismiss the 
amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim.  Over Carter’s objections, 
the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and dismissed Carter’s amended 
complaint with prejudice.  Carter timely appealed. 
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a District 
Court's order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is plenary.  Gelman 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009).  To survive a motion 
to dismiss, a plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the 
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reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] liable for the misconduct alleged.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).  We may summarily affirm if no substantial question is presented 
by the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O. P. 10.6. 
III. 
 Carter first claimed that Defendant Mitchell violated his due process rights in 
connection with his disciplinary hearing.  Specifically, Carter alleged that Mitchell: 1) 
failed to provide him with a copy of the disciplinary decision; 2)  misrepresented the facts 
of the case in order to justify a guilty verdict because there was insufficient evidence to 
convict him; and 3) was biased against him.   
 The District Court correctly determined that Carter failed to allege that he was 
denied the minimum due process protections of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-
65 (1974) during his disciplinary proceedings.
1
  Although Carter claimed that he was 
denied a written copy of Mitchell’s disciplinary hearing report, his submission of a copy 
of Mitchell’s detailed report to the District Court clearly belies his claim.   
 The District Court also correctly dismissed Carter’s claim against Mitchell 
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence.  A prison disciplinary determination comports 
with due process if it is based on “some evidence.”  See Superintendent, 472 U.S. at  
                                              
1
 The minimum required protections are: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary 
charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional 
goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a 
written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the 
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455-56 (“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could 
support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board”).  This standard is minimal and 
does not require examination of the entire record, an independent assessment of the 
credibility of witnesses, or even a weighing of the evidence.  Id. at 455.  The District 
Court correctly pointed to Carter’s admission in his amended complaint that he was in a 
fight with Nguyen and that Nguyen suffered substantial injuries to demonstrate that 
Mitchell’s decision was supported by “some evidence.”   Moreover, Mitchell indicated in 
his report that a video clearly shows Nguyen entering Carter’s cell unharmed, but exiting 
moments later severely beaten.  Thus, Carter’s contention that there is insufficient 
evidence to support the disciplinary determination is without merit. 
 We also agree that Carter’s conclusory allegation that Mitchell was biased is 
insufficient to state a claim.  Carter merely offers a generalized critique of Mitchell’s 
alleged partiality without providing any substantive support for his argument.  He also 
failed to allege facts suggesting that Mitchell was involved in investigating the incident 
with Nguyen, or was in any way personally or substantially involved in the circumstances 
underlying the charge.  See Meyers v. Aldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1974) (“the 
requirement of an impartial tribunal prohibits only those officials who have a direct 
personal or otherwise substantial involvement . . . in the circumstances underlying the 
charge from sitting on the disciplinary body”).  Accordingly, the claim was correctly 
dismissed. 
                                                                                                                                                  




 Next, Carter alleged that Defendants Ciavarella, Corbin, Fisher, Lawler, and 
MacIntyre violated his due process rights when, during the assessment hearing, they 
relied on hearsay evidence in the form of unauthenticated hospital bills, and testimony 
from a prison business office representative regarding those bills.  As the District Court 
explained, however, we have held that a decisionmaker may rely on hearsay evidence in a 
prison disciplinary proceeding.  See Griffin v. Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 22 (3d Cir. 1992).  
Moreover, there is no suggestion that the hospital submitted fraudulent medical bills to 
the prison.  Accordingly, Carter failed to state a claim for relief. 
 We further agree with the District Court that Carter failed to sufficiently allege 
that those same Defendants violated his due process rights by “arbitrarily” denying his 
appeals from his disciplinary conviction.  Indeed, Carter submitted documentation 
showing that the Defendants relied on the relevant evidence available to them in deciding 
his appeals.  Those reports specifically indicate that Defendants Lawler and MacIntyre 
viewed the video of the altercation and found that Mitchell’s decision was supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
 Lastly, Carter attempted to set forth a failure to protect claim against Correctional 
Officers Heberling and Diffin because he believes that the alleged attack should have 
been prevented, which would have alleviated Carter’s need to defend himself.  In order to 
state an Eighth amendment claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety.  Farmer v. 
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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).  To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must 
both “know[] of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”  Id. at 837.  
This standard is subjective, not objective, “meaning that the official must actually be 
aware of the existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should 
have been aware.”  Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001).  
 We agree with the District Court that Carter’s failure to protect claim fails because 
he has not alleged that Correctional Officers Herberling and Diffin were deliberately 
indifferent to an excessive risk to inmate safety.  There is no suggestion that the 
Defendants had any prior warning or knowledge that Carter might be involved in an  
altercation with Nguyen, or that they were aware that Carter’s cell door was unlocked.  
Because Carter’s allegations are insufficient to impose liability against the Defendants, 
we agree with the District Court that he failed to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim. 
 Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s order.2  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
                                              
2
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in striking Carter’s second amended 
complaint, submitted after Defendants filed their motion dismiss, because it was identical 
to Carter’s amended complaint. 
